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Masters of the Channel Night: 
The lOth Destroyer Flotilla's Victory 
off lie De Batz, 9 June 1944 
Michael Whitby 
I t was a dark and somewhat stormy night. In the western English Channel, off the Ile de 
Batz, twelve destroyers, eight Allied (including 
two Canadian) and four German, hurtled 
towards each other at a combined speed of 4 7 
knots. Radar, penetrating the black murk 
ahead of the Allied ships, detected hostile 
contacts at ten miles range and the force 
deployed for action. Minutes later they opened 
devastating fire upon a startled enemy. 
The battle that ensued on the night of 9 
June 1944 was the raison d'etre of the lOth 
Destroyer Flotilla, a destroyer strike force based 
on Plymouth. When planning the Normandy 
invasion Allied naval commanders recognized 
that although Kriegsmarine surface forces 
represented only a limited threat to the 
beachhead, powerful destroyers based in Bay 
of Biscay ports could wreak havoc on vulnerable 
build-up convoys crossing the Channel. 1 But, 
because of the dominance of Allied air power, 
enemy destroyers came out only in the hours of 
darkness. Therefore, to win control of the 
western Channel, the lOth DF had to master 
the difficult art of night fighting. 
I 
Sailors have never been comfortable fighting at night. Quite simply, too much can go 
wrong. Command and control is confused, the 
risk of engaging friendly forces high, navigation 
imprecise, collision a constant worry and the 
chance of surprise from an unexpected quarter 
an ever-present danger. The famous fighting 
admiral, Andrew Cunningham, victor of a night 
battle at Matapan in 1941, summed up these 
hazards well for the Second World War era 
when he concluded that "in no other 
circumstances than in a night action at sea 
does the fog of war so completely descend to 
blind one of the true realization of what is 
happening. "2 
In the Channel, quite apart from the 
"normal" hazards, Allied naval leaders also 
had to face the fact that German destroyers 
had consistently bettered them at night fighting. 
A devastating example of this superiority 
occurred on 22/23 October 1943. While 
conducting an offensive sweep off Britanny, a 
British force consisting of the cruiser Charybdis, 
two Fleet class destroyers and four less-
powerful Hunt class destroyers, was attacked 
by five German fleet torpedo boats-small 
destroyers that packed a powerful punch. In 
what one British participant called "the classic 
balzup of the war,"3 Charybdis and a Hunt 
class destroyer were sunk by torpedoes while 
the Germans escaped unseen and unscathed. 
This defeat was painful proof that the Allies 
were a long way from the supremacy of the 
narrow seas required for the invasion. 4 
The officer responsible for winning control 
of the western Channel was the C-in-C 
Plymouth Command, Vice-Admiral Sir Ralph 
Leatham, who had previously served as C-in-C 
East Indies and Vice-Admiral, Malta. The 
latter appointment had been particularly 
valuable as he had directed offensive strike 
forces in night operations against enemy 
shipping. 5 Since taking over Plymouth in 
August 1943, Leatham had pressed the 
Admiralty for ships to form a homogeneous 
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strike force to battle German destroyers but 
had been continually rebuffed. The Charybdis 
"balzup"" changed everything. Admiralty staff 
officers agreed that the reasons for the defeat 
were that their ships had vastly different 
capabilities, had never been to sea together 
and had no night fighting experience. Their 
solution was to give Leatham the force he had 
pushed for. 6 
Specifically, the C-in-C Plymouth wanted 
Tribal class destroyers. 7 The beautiful, powerful 
Tribals were the British answer to the "super" 
destroyers built by several navies during the 
1930s. Boastingsix4.7-inchguns, two4-inch 
High Angle guns and four 21-inch torpedo 
tubes, the big 1850-ton destroyers had twice 
the firepower of conventional British designs. 
Sixteen were built for the Royal Navy (RN) and 
they attracted the attention of the Canadian 
naval staff, who convinced their government to 
order eight for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). 
The RN Tribals saw much hard fighting during 
the war and, by the time Leatham requested 
them, twelve had been lost, most to air attack. 
Four RCN Tribals were also in commission but 
they, and the one RN ship not in refit or serving 
in another theatre, were needed on the 
Murmansk run. It was not until the surface 
threat to the Russian convoys diminished, 
with the destruction of the battlecruiser 
Scharnhorst on Boxing Day 1943, that five 
Tribals-three Canadian and two British-
became available for the 1Oth Destroyer Flotilla, 
Leatham's strike force. 8 
Equipment fitted in the Tribals, either before 
or after their arrival at Plymouth, was vital to 
their success at night. Foremost was radar. 
British and Canadian Fleet destroyers of the 
period received three types of radar; Gunnery 
(GA). Warning Combined (WC) and Warning 
Surface (WS). 9 For gunnery, all ships in the 
flotilla had Type 285P. Designed early in the 
war as a high angle set for use against aircraft, 
Type 285 had evolved into the standard fire-
control set for destroyers. It provided excellent 
ranges, and was accurate enough to detect 
"overs" and "unders" and (to the mortification 
of operators) incoming rounds. The Type 285's 
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"yagi" dipole aerials were located atop the 
power-mounted director tower and echoes 
were displayed on an A-scope where they 
caused vertical deflections upon a 
horizontal trace. 1° For Warning Combined, 
each of the five destroyers had Type 291, 
another well-tried unit that could detect 
surface contacts at nine miles. The Type 
291 aerial was power-rotated and used an 
A-scope display. The set's great 
disadvantage was that it could be easily 
monitored by the enemy and for this reason 
was seldom used until action was joined. 
The most effective search radars were 
the Warning Surface sets. Unlike Types 
285 and 291 which operated on decimetric 
and metric wavelengths respectively, the 
WS sets were centimetric which gave far 
superior performance, particularly for 
surface search. HMCS Athabaskan and 
the two RN Tribals. Tartar and Ashanti, 
were fitted with the recently developed 
Type 276 which could detect targets of 
destroyer-size outto about 12 miles. Power-
rotation allowed consistent scanning and 
Commander DeWolf and Admiral Leatham in April 1944 
upon Haida's retumfrom the operation that resulted in the 
loss qf Athabaskan. DeWolf is in his sea rig; layers of 
sweaters and a scarf around the neck to keep out the cool 
Channel air. He did not wear a "tin hat" in action. 
the antenna was mounted on a lattice 
foremast which ensured optimum range. 
Echoes were displayed on a Plan Position 
Indicator (PPI) which enabled operators to 
continuously monitor the positions of 
various contacts. This made it a far better 
search instrument than A-scopes which 
only displayed targets along any one bearing. 
Haida and Huron were fitted with the older 
and less effective Type 2 71 Q. Performance was 
not too bad (a destroyer could be detected at 
approximately nine miles) but its antenna was 
manually rotated and, even though Type 271 Q 
could utilize a PPI, Haida and Huron had A-
scopes. Another drawback was that the aerial 
had to be mounted close to its power source, 
Opposite: Shown entering Plymouth in July 1944, 
Huron displays her forward armament of two twin 
4. 7-inch turrets. Type 285P GA radar L<> mounted on 
the Director Control Tower at the back of the bridge 
(facing rearwards). The X-shapecl aerial at the top of 
the tripod foremast is the Type 291 we. while the 
perspex shield of her Type 271 Q WS is visible behind 
the secondfunnel. (Note how it is "wooded'' by the 
forward superstructure.) 
(DND) 
(NAC PA 180348) 
which in the Tribals' case, meant that it was 
located in the searchlight position forward of 
the after canopy, only about forty-five feet 
above the waterline. This not only reduced 
range but the forward superstructure "wooded" 
the beam when it swept directly ahead. 11 It was 
not until stronger lattice foremasts were fitted 
in the autumn of 1944 that the two Tribals 
could be equipped with the latest search radars. 
No matter what their relative merits, these 
systems removed much of the risk from 
operating at night. I tis important to remember, 
however, that radar was still a relatively new, 
vacuum tube, technology. Breakdowns were 
common, especially under the pounding from 
hard steaming or shock from main armament 
blast, and performance was often impaired by 
7 
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climatic conditions. There was not much that 
could be done about the latter, but excellent 
maintenance facilities at Plymouth and well-
trained radar technicians aboard ship reduced 
breakdowns. 
Other new equipment contributed to the 
flotilla's mastery of the night. Navigation, 
notoriously difficult in the Channel, was 
simplified by the radio navigation aid GEE, 
which according to Ashantfs "pilot," enabled 
navigators "to pinpoint their position virtually 
at the touch of a button." 12 Flashless cordite 
helped conceal a ship's position during gunnery 
exchanges and preserved night vision. Tracer 
for the main armament helped gunners judge 
the fall of shot. 13 Each destroyer also carried a 
monitoring device known as HEADACHE which 
allowed them to listen in on enemy R/T 
transmissions. HEADACHE was extremely 
useful but it had to be treated with care. 
Haida's CO, Commander H. G. DeWolf, recalls 
one occasion when intercepts thought to be 
from destroyers about to launch a torpedo 
attack turned out to be conversation among 
minesweepers forming up to enter harbour 
some miles away. 14 Finally, the ships were 
fitted with the latest IFF (Identification Friend 
or Foe) gear which helped ascertain the identity 
of various forces. 
It was not enough to have good equipment; 
it had to be utilized effectively. In his report on 
the Charybdis action, Leatham had noted "that 
the art of night fighting with the added new 
technique of radar has, up to date in this war, 
had very little opportunity of practical test, and 
in the Plymouth Command, at all events, little 
opportunity of exercise." 15 Once his strike 
force came together at the end of January 
1944, however, Leatham put them through a 
concentrated training period that lasted into 
March. 
Because each ship already had a high state 
of individual training, the focus was mainly on 
group training which was accomplished 
through night exercises. These consisted of 
high-speed formation steaming in which ships 
manoeuvred at close quarters, and night 
encounters, where they launched attacks on 
one another. Both evolutions helped the various 
departments in a ship become accustomed to 
8 
A tired-looking Commander Basil Jones on Tartar's 
bridge after an operation. 
the demands of night action and enabled the 
destroyers to get used to working with one 
another. It is difficult to ascertain the exact 
number of such exercises the lOth DF carried 
out during February and March because most 
of the log books of Canadian and British 
destroyers were destroyed after the war. 
However, the cruiser HMS Bellona participated 
in the training and her deck log shows that she 
conducted eight night exercises with the flotilla. 
The destroyers likely did a few more by 
themselves. 16 This is quite a high number 
given other operational, maintenance and 
training requirements. Interspersed with this 
valuable training were several offensive sweeps 
off the French coast. The enemy was not met 
on these early operations but they provided 
important experience and a focus for training. 17 
It was not until April that the 19th DF faced 
trial by fire. On the night of the 25/26, 
Ashanti, Athabaskan, Haida and Huron, 
supported by the cruiser Black Prince, engaged 
three German fleet torpedo boats in a long 
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chase down the Britanny coast. The action 
was conducted at long range and, although all 
German ships suffered damage, it was not 
until Haida and Athabaskan caught T-29 
attempting to break back along the coast that 
one was sunk. Three nights later Haida and 
Athabaskan intercepted the two surviving 
torpedo boats heading to Brest for repairs. As 
before, the Germans reacted by turning away 
and firing torpedoes. Although the two Tribals 
turned towards the enemy, one of the torpedoes 
found Athabaskan and she later blew up in a 
massive explosion. Haida gained a measure of 
revenge by forcing T-27 aground but T-24 
escaped. 18 
The lessons from these actions influenced 
the tactics employed in the June battle. The 
most important lesson concerned weaponry. 
In both encounters the Tribals had achieved 
good accuracy with radar-controlled gunnery 
but results with torpedoes were much less 
impressive-in the first action all four 
destroyers had fired torpedoes at the motionless 
T-29 but, incredibly, all had missed. Not 
surprisingly, guns, which were thought to be 
much better suited to the fast pace of night 
actions, became the weapon of choice. 
Torpedoes, however, remained the enemy's 
most effective weapon. In both engagements 
the reaction of German destroyers had been to 
turn away, fire torpedoes, and race for the 
safety of one of the many harbours along the 
Britanny coast. 19 The challenge facing the 
flotilla was to develop tactics that would enable 
them to evade torpedoes yet get amongst the 
enemy before they could escape. 
The officer who solved this tactical problem 
was Commander Basil Jones. An experienced 
destroyer man, the popular Jones had taken 
command of Tartar and the flotilla in March. 
Canadian Tribals conducting high speed tactical manoeuvres in the ChanneL Such exercises were a vital 
component of the lOth DF's training. 
(NAC PA 151742) 
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Although he had not participated in the April 
actions (Tartar was in refit). he was well aware 
of their lessons. 20 Jones thought that the 
flotilla had "to press on into the enemy during 
his tum away," but for that to be accomplished 
a different formation had to be utilized. The 
traditional night fighting formation was line-
ahead where ships proceeded in column one 
behind the other. Its strength was that it 
allowed ships to maintain contact but Jones 
thought it was unsuitable for the head-on 
encounters prevalent in the Channel because 
ships were prevented from entering action 
10 
together and the destroyers at the head of the 
formation screened the radar of those behind. 
For Jones the solution was simple: 
It was desirable that all destroyers should have their 
forecastle guns bearing, their Radar unimpeded 
ahead, and ships capable of individual action to 
comb enemy torpedoes. Only a reasonably broad 
and shaken-out line of bearing formation [in this 
case, line abreast] could satisfy these conditions. It 
was realised that cruising at night for lengthy periods 
in such a formation was a strain as regards station 
keeping, although the P.P.I. removed much of the 
strain [for those who had it]. Accordingly Line Ahead 
for comfort, and Line of Bearing for action, was the 
order of the day. 2 1 
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It took a bold individual to tamper with the 
RNs hallowed line-ahead but Jones' unorthodox 
tactics, which were supported by Leatham, 
were designed to achieve the treasured naval 
maxim to hit first, hit hard and keep on 
hittingThe loss of Athabaskan at the end of 
April reduced the flotilla's strength to four 
Tribals but reinforcements arrived in May in 
the form of two British and two Polish 
destroyers. Of these new ships, HMS Eskimo 
was the only Tribal but the slightly larger 
Polish myskawica and the sister ships HMS 
Javelin and ORP Piorun had similar qualities. 
Each had two twin turrets on their fo'c'sles 
(probably not a coincidence given the gun 
mentality at Plymouth). HEADACHE and GEE. 
The Polish destroyers had the same radar suit 
as Haida and Huron while the British ships 
This heaped much of the onus for success 
squarely upon the shoulders of the 19th 
Division's commanding officers. It was well 
placed. Jones himself, Commander DeWolf, 
and Huron's Lieutenant Commander H.S. 
Rayner had all established good reputations in 
previous wartime commands, and although 
Ashanti was Lieutenant Commander J .R. 
Barnes' first command, he had proved his 
ability on the Murmansk run and in the 
Channel. Though all were talented officers, 
DeWolf stood a head above the others, a fact 
recognized by his fellow COs. In his memoirs 
Jones described the quiet, determined 
Canadian from Bedford, Nova Scotia "as an 
outstanding officer, not only in skill but 
aggressive spirit. Furthermore he had that 
priceless gift of fortune, . . . of there always 
Although this post-war shot shows a sister ship ofZ-32 in British markings, it nonetheless provides a good view 
of a Type 36A Narvik. Note the twin 5.9-inch turret forward and three single mounts astern; her two quadruple 
banks of torpedo tubes are fore and aft of the secondjunnel. 
had PPI and the latest search radar. What 
separated the newcomers from the core of the 
flotilla was their lack of training and experience. 
The last of them arrived as late as the third 
week of May, so there was no opportunity for a 
comprehensive night training programme. To 
compensate for this, Commander Jones 
concentrated his experienced ships in the 19th 
Division and placed the green destroyers in the 
20th Division. 22 
(DND PMR 92-707; courtesy of K. Macpherson) 
being a target in whatever area he was told to 
operate."23 These talents were all to be key 
factors in the June battle. 
11 
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II 
T he enemy the lOth DF was preparing to meet were the four destroyers of the 
Kriegsmarine's 8th Zerst6reTj1otille. 24 Although 
this German flotilla had good ships, it had 
fallen behind its opponents in training and 
technology, and had thus lost the night fighting 
superiority it once held. 
Typical of German-built warships, Z-32, 
Z-24 and T-24 could withstand a lot of 
punishment, and all four destroyers possessed 
superb torpedo control gear which made the 
torpedo their most dangerous weapon. The 
Narviks' gun armament was powerful but the 
rate of fire was quite low as the large 45 kg 
shells were unwieldy on the pitching deck of a 
destroyer. The greatest collective weakness of 
Blyskawica and other ships of the 1 OthDF in the Channel. The pretty Polish ship was thejastestAllied destroyer 
in the theatre but her withdrawal from the June action prevented her speed from being a factor. 
The 8th Zerst6reTj1otille was very much a 
mixed bag. Z-32 and Z-24 were Type 36A 
destroyers, popularly known as "Narviks." 
Displacing approximately 3000 tons, capable 
of38 knots, and armed with five 5.9-inch guns 
and eight 21.7 -inch torpedo tubes, they were 
larger, faster and packed a heavier punch than 
Tribals. The smaller, slower ZH-1 was a 
captured Dutch destroyer armed with five 4. 7-
inch guns and eight 21.7 -inch torpedo tubes. 
The Type 39 fleet torpedo boat T-24 was the 
weakest member of the flotilla. Displacing only 
1300 tons and capable of 28 knots, she was 
considerably smaller and slower than her 
mates. Armament was four 4.1-inch guns and 
six 21. 7-inch torpedo tubes. 25 
12 
(NAC PA 180512) 
the ships was their wide range of capabilities. 
If they were to operate as a unit they would 
have to conform to T-24's performance which 
deprived the two Narviks of one oftheir greatest 
assets-speed. 
Although the Germans had pioneered the 
development of naval radar, they had fallen 
well behind the Allies by 1944. The main 
reason for this was that the Luftwaffe had been 
given priority over equipment and research, 
and the navy mainly received obsolete hand-
me-downs ill-suited for naval warfare. The 
ships ofthe 8th Zerst6reTj1otille were fitted with 
1940-vintage FuM025 or FuM028, which were 
9
Whitby: Masters of the Channel Night: The 10th Destroyer Flotilla’s Victo
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993
metric sets limited in range and accuracy. 26 A-
scopes w~re used for display and had a 30-
degree blind spot astern, a fact well known to 
the Allies. 27 Performance data is scarce but 
action reports from the 9 June battle reveal 
that their radar indicated a contact on a rough 
bearing, but they had little idea of its range and 
were therefore unable to establish an accurate 
plot. All in all the inadequacy of German naval 
radar at this stage of the war was summed up 
by historian Arthur Hezlet, who concluded 
they "were to the Allied sets as a pocket torch 
is to a car headlight."28 
Training was another deficiency. Since 
1941, there had been a steady turn-over in 
destroyer personnel as experienced officers 
and ratings were transferred to the U-Boat 
arm. This caused a constant need for sea 
training that by 1944 was becoming 
increasingly difficult to accomplish as fuel was 
in short supply and Allied airpower made ships 
vulnerable to attack whenever they left 
harbour. 29 As a result, the four warships that 
engaged the lOth DF had never been to sea 
together before. 
The Germans were better off in terms of 
battle experience. Since Aprill944 the flotilla 
had been commanded by Kapitan zur See Baron 
Theodorvon Bechtolsheim, a veteran destroyer 
officer who had been CO of the Karl Galster in 
many night operations during the first three 
years of the war. Later, he served as chief of 
staff to the FUhrer die ZerstO'rer (FdZ; the officer 
in charge of German destroyers) and was thus 
abreast ofthe latest developments in destroyer 
warfare. Of the four COs, 30 only ZH-l's 
Korvettenkapitan Barkow had not commanded 
his ship in action. Kapitan-Leutnant Meentzen 
in T-24 had a unique edge: he had twice 
survived battles with the lOth DF and his ship 
had sunk Athabaskan. 
III 
T he 8th ZerstO'reljlotille was pressed into action as soon as the German naval high 
command learned of the invasion. Early on 6 
June, Admiral Kranke, the commander of Group 
West, ordered Z-32, Z-24 and ZH-1 from the 
Gironde to join T-24 at Brest and then head 
into the western Channel. The Allies learned of 
these plans almost as soon as they were sent 
because, since 1941, British cryptographers 
had been able to decypher the Kriegsmarine's 
"Home Waters" Enigma that controlled surface 
ship movements. Fully aware of their intentions 
Admiral Leatham ordered air strikes against 
Z-32, Z-24 and ZH-1 on their way to Brest. 
Beaufighter aircraft (including some from 404 
Squadron RCAF) caused light damage, which 
delayed the destroyers' departure from Brest 
until the evening of 8 June. Further decrypts 
revealed their intended course and speed. As 
the four destroyers rounded U shant and headed 
into the Channel, Leatham directed the lOth 
DF into a perfect intercept position, much like 
an air controller vectoring fighters on to a 
bomber. At 0114 hours on 9 June, Tartar's 
Type 276 radar detected a contact bearing 241 
degrees at 10 miles range. Mter allowing the 
plot to develop for eight minutes, Jones gave 
the order to deploy into line of bearing. 
Meanwhile, coastal and shipborne radar had 
provided von Bechtolsheim with some warning 
of the approach of the Allied force, but it was 
only when moonlight exposed the sides of the 
Tribals in the 19th Division that he knew they 
were upon him. 31 
True to form, the Germans turned away to 
port and launched torpedoes. Z-32, Z-24 and 
ZH-1 were able to pick out clear targets and 
each launched four deadly fish at the charging 
19th Division-the 20th Division, positioned 
two miles to the north was still undetected. 
HEADACHE now paid dividends. Von 
Bechtolsheim's order was monitored in all four 
Tribals and the combination of this warning, 
along with the flexibility of the line-of-bearing 
formation, allowed the torpedoes to be avoided 
with relative ease. 32 
Jones wanted to engage the enemy in a 
close-range "pell-mell battle," which resulted 
after the 19th Division, followed closely by the 
20th (two miles to the north), opened fire. The 
German destroyers were in the midst of their 
initial turn to port and lay across the bows of 
the 19th Division at a range of approximately 
3500 yards in the order, from north to south, 
Z-32, ZH-1, Z-24, and T-24. As the northernmost 
ship in the 19th Division, Tartar initially 
13 
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engaged Z-32, hitting her four times, but 
when she sped off northwards Commander 
Jones left her for the 20th Division and 
joined Ashanti in firing upon ZH-1 and then 
Z-24. Haida first engaged Z-24 but DeWolf. 
much to the chagrin of his gunnery officer 
who had to lay on a new target, joined Huron 
against T-24.33 From this point the battle 
devolved into confusion-the best way to 
untangle events is to follow each German 
destroyer after the initial clash. 
After escaping from Tartar, Z-32 benefitted 
from the 20th Division's lack of experience. 
Led by Commander C.F. Namiesniowski in 
Blyskawica, the division had not deployed 
into line-of-bearing but had remained in 
line-ahead. Despite this, the encounter began 
well. All four destroyers quickly scored hits 
on Z-32 but before they could press home 
their advantage, Blyskawica's HEADACHE 
operator reported that the enemy was about 
to launch torpedoes. Rather than turning 
towards Z-32, Namiesniowski laid smoke and 
hauled around to starboard. The rest of the 
division, thinking they were wheeling for a 
torpedo attack, followed suit with Eskimo 
and Javelin firing torpedoes as they turned. 
Then, instead of re-engaging Z-32, 
Namiesniowski compounded his original error 
by leading the division away from the action 
for fifteen minutes. All contact with the 
enemy was lost and the division played no 
further role in the battle. It was now four 
against four. 34 
Commander Jones refers to this episode 
as "a Polish variation."35 If nothing else it 
emphasizes the value of experience and 
training. The flotilla had learned that it was 
crucial to turn towards the enemy in order to 
maintain contact. Namiesniowski had been 
briefed on this tactic but he had obviously 
found it difficult to carry out. Battle 
experience would have demonstrated the 
necessity of this manoeuvre and training 
would have made it easier to accomplish. 
Namiesniowski was not the only officer in 
the 20th Division to go wrong that night. 
Certain confidential publications were 
supposed to be destroyed before sorties off 
14 
an enemy coast but, remarkably, Javelin's 
Signals Officer also destroyed his signal books 
prior to leaving harbour. According to his 
CO, this blunder (or "British variation," as 
Poles may want to call it), rendered Javelin 
"completely deaf and dumb as no signals 
could be sent out or decoded."36 Again, 
inexperience had taken its toll. 
Having survived two tussles with the 
enemy, von Bechtolsheim headed west in an 
attempt to reform his force. 37 Instead, he 
found himself in yet another fight. At 0 138 
hours, Z-32 sighted Tartar at close range and 
quickly scored three hits on her bridge 
superstructure. Tartar's navigator's yeoman 
described the devastation wrought by the 
5.9-inch shells: 
When the actual crashes came upon us the A.I.C. 
was plunged in darkness and a brilliant flash 
pronounced the end of the Type 293 (sic) Radar set. 
Shrapnel rattled around in all directions and soon 
the small compartment filled with choking smoke. 
Pandemonium reigned for a few minutes on the 
bridge immediately above us, and from the 
wheelhouse adjoining our action station came the 
voice of the Coxswain shouting loudly, "Someone's 
been hit" .... Curling smoke swirled everywhere, and 
the stench of blood was sickening. 38 
One officer and two ratings were killed 
and several others were wounded. Fire raged 
around the forward superstructure and the 
loss of all radar and W.T. gear temporarily 
prevented Commander Jones, who was 
slightly wounded, from exercising control of 
his force. 39 Happily for the lOth DF, the 
battle-wise COs of Ashanti, Haida and Huron 
knew their stuff. 
At this point fortune again smiled upon 
Z-32. Tartar had hit her three times in their 
brief exchange and von Bechtolsheim tried 
to break off to assess damage. As he 
attempted his escape, Ashanti, who had been 
attracted by gun flashes and a HEADACHE 
report that an enemy destroyer was heading 
towards the burning Tartar, brought Z-32 
under fire. However, before any decisive 
damage was incurred, the thick pall of smoke 
from Tartar's fires shielded Z-32. Before 
Ashanti could locate her in the murk, ZH-1 
emerged, "wallowing and helpless."40 
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ZH-1 had been badly mauled by Ashanti 
and Tartar at the outset of the battle. Among 
a deluge ofhits, several shells had penetrated 
her machinery spaces, cut all power and 
brought her to a stop. When the vast 
quantities of steam and smoke that 
surrounded her lifted, she lay unveiled before 
her original assailants, who quickly finished 
her off. Despite her own damage, Tartar 
raked ZH-1 with fire from point-blank range 
while Ashanti put two torpedoes into her. 
Realizing his ship was doomed, 
Korvettenkapitan Barkow ordered her 
abandoned and laid scuttling charges. At 
0235 hours, ZH-1 blew up in a massive blast 
that was heard all over the western Channel. 
To the southwest, Haida and Huron were 
pursuing Z-24 and T-24. When the battle 
was joined, they had engaged the two ships 
which were third and fourth in the German 
formation. At 0127 hours Haidaopened fire 
with rapid salvoes from "A" mounting ("B" 
was firing starshell) at a target to starboard 
at a range of 4000 yards. According to 
DeWolfs after-action report, the target, which 
proved to be Z-24, "just then turning away, 
very quickly started to make smoke and zig 
zag at fine inclinations. Some ten or fifteen 
salvoes were fired at this target and several 
possible hits were scored before another 
target was observed to the left."41 Z-24, 
which was also briefly engaged by Tartar and 
Ashanti, suffered severe damage and 
casualties from hits to the bridge, engine 
room and forward gun mount. The chaos 
caused by these hits forced her to turn away 
to southwestward.42 
The situation was equally confused on 
T-24. She had been totally surprised when 
starshell burst overhead and 4. 7 -inch tracer 
rocketed by. ZH-1 was being pounded close-
by, and the torpedo boat narrowly avoided 
colliding with the burning destroyer as the 
latter veered out of control. When a Narvik was 
This shot ofHaida, Tartar and the cruiser Bellona exercising in the Channel shows the nice lines of a Tribal. Haida 
wears the greys and green of the Special Home Fleet Destroyers Pattern camouflage. 
(NAC PA 163952) 
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seen withdrawing westward, Kapitan-Leutnant 
Meentzen followed, thinking it was the leader 
Z-32. All this time, his ship was engaged by 
Huron and then Haida but, although there 
were many near misses, no hits resulted. 43 
The battle now took a familiar turn for the 
Canadians. In each previous action they had 
become involved in long chases; now they 
pursued Z-24 and T-24 as they fled 
southwestward. Conditions did not favour 
Haida and Huron. DeWolflater reported that 
the enemy ships: 
were engaged with the wind dead ahead and rain 
squalls were frequent. Cloud base was never more 
than 1000 feet and often as low as 500 feet. 
Consequently illumination was poor and starshell 
were generally half burned before they effected any 
illumination whatsoever. The enemy made excellent 
use of smoke throughout and continuously took 
avoiding action thus making spotting at time well 
nigh impossible. 44 
The performance of search and gunnery 
radars was also hampered by the poor 
conditions. Despite these difficulties, the 
two Tribals pounded southwestward at 32 
knots and would likely have succeeded in 
overhauling the slower T-24 had fate not 
intervened. 
Under the codename Operation "Maple," 
the allies had laid a series of defensive 
minefields along the French coast to restrict 
the movements ofU-boats and surface vessels 
against the invasion corridors. 45 On this 
night they had the opposite effect. At 0150 
hours plots kept in the two Canadian 
warships indicated that the Germans were 
entering minefield QZX-1330. Haida and 
Huron were forced to alter course while Z-24 
and T-24 steamed through the field of 150 
mines with impunity. 46 When the Tribals 
resumed direct pursuit they had fallen nine 
miles behind the enemy and radar contact 
was lost shortly thereafter. At 0214 hours, 
because his position "with regard to own 
forces and remainder of the enemy was 
obscure,"47 DeWolf abandoned the chase to 
reform on Tartar. Z-24 and T-24later turned 
back towards the battle but played no further 
role and eventually made it to Brest. 
16 
By this time the situation throughout the 
battle zone was thoroughly confused with 
both commanders unsure of their own forces 
let alone that of the enemy. At 0237 hours, 
Commander Jones, his communications 
restored, attempted to gain a semblance of 
order by signalling his ships to concentrate 
on Tartar. To the west, von Bechtolsheim 
also continued his efforts to raise his ships 
and headed "on a southern course in order 
not to get too far away from the battle area. "48 
Meanwhile, the Canadian destroyers were 
proceeding carefully towards Tartar. Visibility 
was obscured by rain squalls while climatic 
conditions and the shock from gun blasts 
and high speed running had made radar 
imprecise and unreliable. Despite this, at 
0223 hours both ships obtained a firm 
contract bearing 032 degrees at six miles. 
Because their plots indicated that Tartar 
should bear 040, both DeWolf and Rayner 
thought this was their leader. IFF could 
provide no confirmation because they could 
not be certain that Tartar's gear was not 
damaged. According to DeWolf: 
At 0230 sighted ship ahead steering a northerly 
direction at slow speed. assumed to be TARTAR. 
Made identification by light and ordered Plot to carry 
out radar search for other ships which might be 
concentrating. Ship in sight replied to our signal by 
light. but his signals were unintelligible. Main 
armament was brought to the ready and the challenge 
made, but the reply was again unintelligible. I still 
considered it might be TARTAR with damaged 
signalling gear and [wounded] personnel. The ship 
made smoke and turned away to the west and south 
but was not plotted by Radar and range was opened 
to 9000 yards before this move was appreciated. 49 
Z-32, the ship encountered by the 
Canadians, was equally cautious. Von 
Bechtolsheim noted that "Individual shadows 
are sighted. Exchanges of recognition signals 
by blinker gun, and even by night 
identification signal, do not lead to any 
identification. The fact that, despite German 
recognition signal interrogation, these 
shadows do not fire, however causes me to 
make the decision not to use my weapons." 50 
13
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Z-32 initially accelerated away to the 
northwest but over the next 18 minutes 
gradually swung around to an easterly course. 
After the battle, von Bechtolsheim explained 
his thinking: 
Standing here alone with Z-32 I can do nothing 
against the too powerful enemy, especially since my 
reserve torpedoes would first have to be reloaded and 
my artillery ammunition is no longer suftlcient for a 
lengthy battle. My goal must continue to be to head 
east. Since I can no longer reach Cherbourg before 
daybreak, I decide to head for St. Malo. I am hoping 
that, on my way there and before reaching the 
Channel Islands area, I will have the remaining 
destroyers with me. 51 
Despite Z-32's reaction, DeWolf still had 
doubts about the identity of the contact. 
Finally, at 0254 hours, starshell revealed the 
distinctive silhouette of a Narvik. Both Tribals 
immediately opened fire with "A" and "B", 
mounts with "X" providing starshell 
illumination. Again, shooting conditions were 
poor. Dense smoke laid by Z-32 made spotting 
difficult but tracer was followed for line and 
Type 285 provided precise ranging (von 
Bechtolsheim thought the accurate fire was 
due to flares dropped from aircraft!). Several 
hits were scored but before they had any 
telling effect minefield QZX-1330 again 
intervened on the enemy's behalf. 
Z-32 entered the minefield from the west 
at 0311 hours, and Haida and Huron were 
forced to alter around it to the northeast. By 
the time they had done so at 0342 hours, 
Z-32was ten miles to the southeast. Minutes 
later radar contact was lost. On Haida's 
bridge the sense of frustration was deep as 
17 
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Z-32 photographed hard aground on the Ile de Batz the day after the battle. The forward twin turret is pointed 
in the direction that Haida and Huron were firing in the final stage of the battle. Later that day she was destroyed 
by Allied strike aircraft. including Beaufighters from the RCAF' s 404 Squadron. 
"for the second time it looked as if the enemy 
would escape through the intervention of 
this minefield." Although DeWolf thought it 
likely that the enemy would escape into the 
small port ofMorlaix, he doggedly continued 
the chase with Huron matching his every 
move. 52 
Like DeWolf, von Bechtolsheim remained 
optimistic. Although Z-32 had endured 
"numerous heavy and light hits," the damage 
was "not severe enough to force me to avoid 
another battle." He expected this 
confrontation would occur in the area of the 
Channel Islands (presumably because that 
was on the invasion flank) but believed he 
would have a good chance of success as Z-24 
and T-24, thought to be only twelve miles 
astern, would have joined by then. This hope 
was shattered at 0420 hours when the two 
ships reported they were actually 25 miles to 
westward and requested permission to return 
18 
(DND CN-6870) 
to Brest. Von Bechtolsheim's reaction to this 
setback is testimony to his professionalism: 
With a heavy heart I must therefore decide to break 
off the mission ordered. In this situation I cannot 
force a breakthrough to the east with "Z 32" alone. 
Will still have to wait and see whether the 
breakthrough to the west will be successful. I 
continue to suspect that there are more naval forces 
as contact keepers to the northwest of me. 
If von Bechtolsheim had possessed good 
search radar he would not have had to guess 
what lay to the west; as it was his suspicions 
proved correct. 53 
Since 0412 hours, Haida and Huron's 
Type 271Q indicated they were slowly 
overhauling Z-32 from the northwest but at 
0432 hours the range began to drop rapidly. 
DeWolf first suspected that the enemy was 
heading south for the safety of the coast but 
15
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it soon became apparent that he was heading 
westward and the Canadians altered to the 
south to cut him off. Commander Jones had 
concentrated the other destroyers about six 
miles to the north where he could cut off any 
attempt by the enemy to escape eastward. 
Z-32 was trapped. 
At 0444 hours Haida and Huron opened 
fire at 7000 yards range. Z-32, thinking she 
was under attack from two cruisers, altered to 
the south, returned fire and launched her 
remaining torpedoes. The underwater 
projectiles missed their mark and although 
several 5.9-inch shells burst close to the 
Tribals, they caused no damage. On the 
fo'c'sles of the Canadian destroyers, gun 
crews worked hard slamming 50-pound shells 
and 35-pound cartridges into the four 4. 7-
inch guns. DeWolf initially ordered rapid 
salvoes but dismayed by the apparent results, 
changed to more accurate salvoes at 0452 
hours. Even with that reduction, five or six 
salvoes of semi-armour piercing shells roared 
out towards the enemy every minute. 
Although both DeWolf and Rayner were 
unsure if they were hitting, von Bechtolsheim 
attests to the accuracy of their shooting. He 
had altered southwards "to get out of the 
excellent straddle coverage of the enemy gun 
batteries. The ship is constantly caught by 
hits. The way things are going, my running 
won't last long." Except for one brief 
interruption Haida and Huron kept up their 
withering fire. (Blyskawica briefly joined in 
from the north but did not score any hits.) 
Sometime around 0500 hours, Z-32's port 
engine quit and three hits put "Anton" (the 
forward turret) out of action. Hoping that the 
"tremendous quantities" of shells fired by 
the Tribals would cause them to run out of 
ammunition, von Bechtolsheim attempted to 
escape along the coast but at 0513 hours, in 
the midst of continuous hits, the starboard 
engine lost power. Realizing the end was at 
hand, von Bechtolsheim ordered the ship, 
now engulfed by flames, run aground. Haida 
and Huron fired a few more salvoes but 
checked fire when they realized Z-32lay hard 
on the rocky shore of lle de Batz. 54 
IV 
T he defeat on 9 June 1944 dashed any German hopes of interceding against 
the western flank of the invasion. Not only 
had they lost Z-32 and ZH -1 but the damage 
to Z-24 took weeks to repair and there was 
little that T-24 could do alone. Neither 
survivor carried out any further offensive 
sorties and, on 25 August, were sunk by 
Allied fighter-bombers off Le Verdon. 55 
The Germans attributed the defeat to 
their poor state of training, the withdrawal of 
Z-24 and T-24, and overwhelming odds. Von 
Bechtolsheim's performance was justifiably 
praised. The FdZ, Admiral Kreisch, lauded 
him as a "daring, experienced and resolute 
commander, with excellent tactical skills, 
exemplary offensive spirit and a clear 
perspective of the battle" who had "brought 
honour to the destroyer arm. "56 
But for the 20th Division's "inexcusable" 
turnaway, Leatham and Admiralty 
commentators thought that the lOth DF 
would likely have completely destroyed the 
enemy. As it was they ascribed the success 
to the ability and experience of the 19th 
Division, the bold tactics devised by 
Commander Jones, and the persistence of 
the Canadian ships. The only real criticisms 
concerned Namiesniowski's error, the fragility 
of some equipment, particularly IFF, and the 
failure of ships to broadcast situation reports 
throughout the action. 57 
From a strictly Canadian viewpoint, Haida 
and Huron's role in the battle demonstrated 
the ability of Canadian sailors and, with 
newspapers filled with accounts of the victory, 
garnered much positive publicity for the navy. 
The attention was a welcome change for a 
service that had spent most of the war toiling 
in relative obscurity on the harsh North 
Atlantic. To this day Haida remains Canada's 
most famous warship and "Hard Over Harry" 
DeWolf. who later rose to become Chief of 
Naval Staff, her most renowned fighting sailor. 
19 
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